·
Gnanaseelan,
J. (June 2013). Reconciliation
between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka: Propaganda in Media Discourse. Puthiya Panuval : An International Journal of Tamil Studies, Chennai
- 600 005, India. Vol 5, No 01, ISSN: 0975 – 6213 ; p.116-128. available at http://www.indianfolklore.org/journals/index.php/Panu/article/view/1309/1480
Reconciliation
between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka:
Propaganda
in Media Discourse
Jeyaseelan Gnanaseelan
Senior Lecturer, Vavuniya Campus of the University of Jaffna
Park Road, Vavuniya, Sri Lanka
jeya86@hotmail.com
__________________________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT
The reconciliation between
Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka has become an internationally sensitive political
issue, discussed even at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva at
present. Sri Lanka has been suffering due to the protracted ethnic conflict for
three decades. The rupture between the Sinhalese and Tamils is ever widening,
thanks to the propagandist function of Media. Media plays a key role in many conflict-torn
democracies throughout the world. The Propaganda Model, developed by Edward
Herman and Noam Chomsky, claims that elite media interconnect with other
institutional sectors in ownership, management and social circles. It
constrains their ability to remain analytically detached from other dominant
institutional sectors (especially in their knowledge construction) for proper
governance and political reconciliation. This paper attempts to assess the
relevance of this knowledge construction using this Model. The analysis of the selected
editorials of the Sri Lankan English newspapers on the ethnic conflict,
reconciliation and governance (mainly during the period of Ceasefire Agreement
(2002- 2006) between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam and post-CFA periods) traces an ideological significance in their
discourse construction. The editorials reveal the State, ethnic and party
-based and -biased ideologies. They implicitly support cultural nationalism
cloaked by constitutional nationalism and argue that globalization facilitates ‘inter
state-security’, and not intra-state security. The paper studies whether the
media can contribute to the knowledge base for reconciliation and governance
leading to legitimization, political accommodation and ideological management.
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Key
words: media discourse, ethnic
conflict, governance, reconciliation, knowledge and ideological construction ____________________________________________________________________________________
1. Introduction
This paper applies the ‘propaganda model’ of media operations
developed by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent: The
Political Economy of the Mass Media to the Sri Lankan Media’s discourse
construction. Herman and Chomsky’s Model claims that elite media interconnect
with other institutional sectors in ownership, management and social circles.
This Model is applied to a discourse analysis of the selected editorials of the
Sri Lankan English newspapers on the ethnic conflict resolution under
international intervention during the period of Ceasefire Agreement (2002-
2006) between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam. It traces an ethnonationalist ideological significance in their
editorial construction projecting binary positions in the knowledge
construction for governance and reconciliation.
According to
Ponnambalam in his book, Sri Lanka: The National
Question and the Tamil Liberation struggle, after
Sri Lanka gained independence from Great Britain in 1948, discrimination against
Tamils increased through government policies and led to resistance. In the late
1970s, the Tamil militants materialized their armed struggle after non-violent
resistance groups failed to raise awareness for their cause. Thus the present
day conflict took a significant national as well as international dimension in
Sri Lanka with the Sinhalese fighting to maintain control of Sri Lanka to
project a Sinhala identity to the country as a whole and the Tamils fighting
for an end to discrimination, for equal representation in political and
economic affairs and recognition of their traditional homeland in the Northeast
of Sri Lanka.
Chomsky
in Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies talks of ‘the primary targets of the manufacture of consent are
those who regard themselves as "the more thoughtful members of the
community," the "intellectuals, and “the opinion leaders". The
Sri Lankan Newspapers also, internalized by majoritarianism target the same groups of members nationally
as well as internationally to mobilize them against Tamil nationalism and the
conflict interventions made by India in the past and by the Norway-led
International Community for "he who mobilizes the elite, mobilizes the
public," (Chomsky 47). This paper inquires into Chomsky’s concern about
‘the necessary effect of the present economic system upon the whole system of
publicity; upon the judgment of what news is, upon the selection and
elimination of matter that is published, upon the treatment of news in both
editorial and news columns’ (131). Thus it endorses his statement ‘how far
genuine intellectual freedom and social responsibility are possible on any
large scale under the existing economic regime’. Chomsky disapproves of ‘the
reigning social order’, and the idea that ‘the general public must remain an
object of manipulation, not a participant in thought’. Any rebellious attempts
by the underprivileged against the privileged have long been understood as "crises
of democracy" (131).
2.
Conflict Background
The conflict
between the Tamils and the Sinhalese is not a recent phenomenon in the political
life of Sri Lanka.
The conflict history consists of many centuries during the pre-colonial era and
of many decades during the post-colonial era. But the present conflict dates
back from immediately after the colonial period. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka dates back to the fifth century BC when the
first Sinhalese migrated from India
to the island. The Sinhala historians base their origin as North
India. The Tamils came from South India
with a totally different language and religion. From the beginning, territorial
disputes caused tension between the ethnic groups. Later, the Dutch, Portuguese,
British, and American intervention in Sri
Lanka influenced political, educational, and
religious developments within the island, each country showing favouritism to
either the Tamils or the Sinhalese.
After Sri
Lanka gained independence from Great Britain in 1948, discrimination against
the Tamils increased through government policies and led to resistance. In the
late 1970s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) materialized after
non-violent resistance groups failed to raise awareness for their cause. The
formation of the LTTE began the present day conflict between the Sinhalese and
the Tamils of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese fighting to maintain control of Sri Lanka and the
Tamils fighting for an end to discrimination and for representation in political
affairs.
3.
Indian Intervention for reconciliation and fair governance
The Indian government’s interest in
Sri Lankan affairs increased from 1983 through 1987. Numerous attempts at
mediation between the Sinhalese and the Tamils failed. The impetus for such
intervention was most likely the pressure from the many citizens of Tamil Nadu
who were related to the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Finally, the Indian military
intervened in 1987. Negotiations were held, and the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord
was signed on July 29, 1987, by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri
Lankan President Jayewardene. The accord stated that the Indian government
would not support a separate Tamil state; however, it did recognize the
northern and eastern areas as “areas of historical habitation” (Hennayake 408).
This
was eventually enacted as the 13th Amendment. The Indian Peace-Keeping Force
(IPKF) established order in the north and east. Consequently, the JVP uprising
took place in the south against the Indian military presence. Few of the
demands agreed to in the Agreement were implemented. When the militants refused
to disarm its fighters, the IPKF tried to demobilize them by force and ended up
in full-scale conflict with the Tamils. Simultaneously, nationalist sentiment
led many Sinhalese to oppose the continued Indian presence. Casualties mounted
and eventually India
pulled out its troops in March 1990.
4.
International Intervention for Reconciliation
The war has caused great damage to the population and economy of the
country. In 2001, however, the militants announced a unilateral ceasefire just
before Christmas 2001. The new United National Front (UNF) government
reciprocated the unilateral ceasefire offer and signed an MOU in February 2002.
Norway
and other Nordic countries monitored the ceasefire through the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
The militants temporarily
pulled out of the peace talks in 2003, citing lack of attention on an interim
political solution. The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) rejected the Interim
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal submitted by the militants for
the northeast of the island of Sri Lanka on
October 31, 2003. In 2004 the United People Freedom Alliance (UPFA) came to
power. The Asian tsunami of late 2004 killed more than 30,000 people in the
country. It was hoped that the disaster would bring the warring sides together,
but the conflict continued. The militants suggested a Post-Tsunami Operation
Mechanism Structure (PTOMS) for rehabilitating the north-east victims. But due
to the strong opposition from the Sinhala hardliners, and the consequent
Supreme Court verdict, it was abandoned.
Gradually the situation became complicated by allegations that both
sides violated the CFA. In light of this renewed violence that erupted in
December 2005, ethnic riots and unsolved murders suspected to have been
committed by the military and the militants’ attacks followed. A new crisis,
and possibly the resumption of a proper war, emerged in July 2006, resulting in
the International Community’s scepticism over resumption of the peace talks. At
last the ceasefire agreement was unilaterally abrogated by the government on 16th
January 2008.
5.
Objective
The
Research Problem is whether the editorial knowledge constructions of journalists
and editors of the Sri Lankan elite media hide or express their ideological and
attitudinal positions in subtle and mild forms. The general objective is
to investigate the ideological and attitudinal positions of the Sri
Lankan English newspaper editorial discourse on conflict resolution,
reconciliation between Tamils and Sinhalese.
6. Methodology
Selected editorials of the Sri
Lankan English National newspapers on the ethnic conflict, reconciliation and
governance mainly during the period of Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) (2002- 2006)
between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
and post-CFA periods were analysed. This research bases its data on 1249
editorials taken from The Daily News and The Sunday Observer (397), The
Island and The Sunday Island (440), The Daily Mirror and The
Sunday Times (250), The Morning Leader and The Sunday Leader (162).
The ‘propaganda model’ of media operations formed and applied
by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent: The Political
Economy of the Mass Media, stipulates that the mass media are instruments
of power that ‘mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the
state and private activity’ (11). Media function is the central mechanisms of propaganda
in the capitalist democracies and class interests have ‘multilevel effects on
mass-media interests and choices. Chomsky in Propaganda and
the Public Mind says:
It goes right from kindergarten up ...
People are supposed to be obedient producers, do what they're told, and the
rest of your life is supposed to be passive consuming. Don't think about
things. Don't know about things ... Just do what you're told, pay attention to
something else and maximize your consumption. That's the role of the public
(19).
Media
do not have to be controlled nor does their behaviour have to be patterned, as
it is assumed that they are integral actors in class warfare, fully integrated
into the institutional framework, and act in unison with other ideological
sectors, i.e. the academy, to establish, enforce, reinforce and police
corporate hegemony.
Herman
and Chomsky (1–35) argue that the ‘raw material of news’ passes through a
series of five interrelated filter constraints, ‘leaving only the cleansed
residue fit to print’. These filter elements continuously ‘interact with and
reinforce one another’ and have multilevel effects on media performance (2).
The five filter elements are: (1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner
wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (2)
advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of
the media on information provided by government, business, and ‘experts’ funded
and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (4) ‘flak’ as a
means of disciplining the media; and (5) ‘anti-communism’ as a national
religion and control mechanism. Chomsky in Propaganda and
the Public Mind states that ‘a standard technique
of belief formation is to do something in your own interest and then to
construct a framework in which that's the right thing to do’ (167).
7. Analysis, Findings and Discussion
The discourse
of editorial texts is not free or more or less arbitrary. That is, according to
van Dijk in Discourse and Inequality , ethnic minorities are linked to the
prominence and availability of the overall social cognitions such as (a)
Socio-cultural difference and lack of adjustment and tolerance; (b) Deviance of
established (dominant) norms (including terrorism, violence and crime); (c)
Competition for scarce resources (educational, economic and natural resources)
(25).
Chomsky in Media
Control talks about the media’s attempt at atomizing
and segregating the people: “they're not supposed to organize, because then
they might be something beyond spectators of action. They might actually be
participants if many people with limited resources could get together to enter
the political arena. That is really threatening”(23). In this Sri Lankan media
context, these discourse themes have been constructed in binary positions between
US and THEM; THEM is given in terms of deviance and threats, viz., as threats
to our country, space, population composition, and ethnic representation in
political power, employment, education etc. It recognizes the typical concerns
of dominant group members. The discourse reveals the underlying prejudices,
group norms and goals, as well as dominant ideologies. Van Dijk in Discourse
and Inequality establishes “a first link between text structures and the structures
of underlying social cognitions. The discourse tells us something about “the
hierarchical structures and of our social representations in memory” (25).
The first
filter constraint in his model emphasizes that media are closely interlocked and
share common interests with other dominant institutional sectors (corporations,
the state, banks). With the nationalisation of the
largest newspaper group in the early 1970s, the stage was set for government
manipulation of the media. Since, the State media has been under the control of
successive governments, it is perceived as a vehicle for government propaganda.
The appointment of reporters, editors, directors and managers has always been
aimed at fulfilling partisan agendas. In the case of state television and
radio, legal safeguards were also readily available. Herman and Chomsky point
out: “the dominant media firms are quite large businesses; they are controlled
by very wealthy people or by managers who are subject to sharp constraints by
owners and other market-profit-oriented forces” (14).
The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Limited (ANCL) was a previously
successful family run newspaper enterprise. It was “nationalised” by the Prime Minister,
Bandaranayake, of the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP) in 1973 with the then government taking over 75% of its shares,
stating intention to broad-base ownership of the company by distribution of
shares amongst the public but it was not done. The aim was to curtail its
support to the rival main party, UNP. From then onwards, it functions as the
mouthpiece of the government in power. When the United National Party (UNP) was
in power in 1987, they were forced to construct a positive representation of
the Indian intervention like the JR government which was forced to enter into
the Indo-Lanka Agreement. But the Sinhala readership was against the Agreement.
However, later, J.R Jayawardene, the Sri Lankan President, manipulated the
intervention climate to go against the Tamil militants and the Tamils. The
young Indian Prime Minister and the Indian policy makers on Sri Lanka became
‘the victims’ to the political shrewdness of J.R. Jayawardene’s experience; in
consequence, the Tamil militants and Tamils have become the victims.
The
Daily News and the Sunday Observer indirectly and ideologically adheres to cultural
nationalism. Based on the research on Ethnic Conflict and International
Relations in the Editorials of Sri Lankan
English Newspapers: a Discourse
Analysis, it represents the party in power first and then gives priority to
the government position but overtly it constructs ‘constitutional nationalism’(Gnanaseelan,
175-185). It invites the Tamils and the International Community to reach a
hybrid solution both militarily and politically imposed: it can be either
centralized or ‘de-centralized’ power devolution while taking care of ‘the
elimination of terrorism and secessionism’ (Gnanaseelan, 175-185). The
newspaper group’s position had been always confusing and ambiguous through out
the peace process because it had come under the control of both the major
governments of alliance: UNF and UFPA. In this post-war situation, it is almost
silent about devolution and is always vocal about development.
When the UNP government signed the CFA agreement with the militants
in 2002, it strongly supported the intervention of the international community.
The other newspapers expressed many complications and implications of the
intervention. It constructed a binary position: intervention versus
interference. Later, when the Rajapakse-led SLFP took over the regime in 2006,
it started to express the same, for, it goes with the Chomsky’s idea in Media Control that ‘propaganda
is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state’ (20).
Herman in “The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective” states
that the dramatic changes in the economy, the
communications industries, and politics over the past dozen years have tended
on balance to enhance the applicability of the propaganda model (101-12). The first
two filters – ownership and advertising – have become even more important. The
Sinhala ownership and Sinhala readership have given the trust for upholding the
ideologies.
However, the private media’s situation was different from the state
press. The Island Group (27 years- World Press Trends, 2000) was and has been owned by the relatives of the major party leaders,
mainly the SLFP. They are said to be the most "scrutinizing" and very
‘nationalistic’ in character and widely read newspapers. Though the ownership
had links with the SLFP, it follows a neutral approach to the party politics. However,
its construction of the Indian intervention in 1987 and international
intervention in 2002 was so negative and not to the liking of the international
community or India. It is said to be the propaganda organ of ethnonationalism
but overtly it constructs ‘the constitutional nationalism’ in ‘preserving the
state sovereignty and security in the ethnic conflict resolution and
reconciliation process’ and comments on the role of the International Community
solely within this framework.
It persuades ultimately for a centralized power or governance system
and elimination of ‘terrorism’ through a militarily imposed solution. This
trend reflects Chomsky’s idea in Necessary
Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies
that the owners and managers or
commentators ‘belong to the same privileged elites, and might be
expected to share the perceptions, aspirations, and attitudes of their
associates, reflecting their own class interests as well’. Journalists also
should ‘conform to these ideological pressures, generally by internalizing the
values’ and ‘those who fail to conform will tend to be weeded out by familiar
mechanisms’ (8).
Wijeya Newspapers Ltd (Formerly the Times Group) was started by Ranjit
Wijewardane in 1979. A family link was established between the Upali Group and
the Times Group; it is considered as the most "independent" and, it
is said to be the most "daring" one in publishing the issues of
national security and national harmony. It also runs only English and
Sinhala newspapers for 38 years. Like the Upali group, the Wijeya group too
took a neutral stand on party politics. However, it is slightly more critical
of the SLFP than the UNP. It could be traced to the ownership relations with
the latter. It was highly critical of the Indian intervention in 1987 but later
took a pro-Indian stand when India
banned the Tamil militants. Generally it welcomed the international
intervention in 2002 but whenever the International Community seemed to
recognize the Tamil militants and was sympathetic to the grievances and
political rights of the Tamils and expected a federal solution to the crisis,
the institution was critical of it developing the binary: federalism versus
unitarism.
The Sunday Times and Daily Mirror has been considered as the most tolerable one. It constructs
‘constitutional nationalism’ in ‘preserving the state sovereignty and security
in the Ethnic conflict resolution process’ and commented on the negative role
of the International Community. Finally with or without the assistance of the
International community it seeks a politically imposed solution: A pseudo
‘de-centralization of power’ and elimination of secessionism.
Leader Publications Ltd published the Sunday Leader (15 years) by an
independent group called Leader Publications. It is more critical of the SLFP government
and many news items are inclined towards UNP; earlier it was considered as the
most "party-based" newspaper in publishing the issues of rivalry of
national party politics. It was also highly critical of the Indian intervention
in 1987 and after the ban of the militants, undertook propaganda to get Indian
assistance in neutralizing the militants rather than in devolving the power to
the Tamils in the Northeast and in recognizing the areas as their homeland. It
welcomed the international intervention in 2002 because the inviter was the UNP
but later, like other two private owned newspapers groups, began to criticize
the overindulgence and pro-Tamil approach of the International Community. First
it focuses on the party needs and then constructs ‘constitutional nationalism’.
It supports conflict intervention to find a solution, the ‘de-centralization of
power’ and elimination of secessionism through both military and political
imposition . Chomsky highlighted it in his statement: ‘the media serve the
interests of state and corporate power, which are closely interlinked, framing
their reporting and analysis in a manner supportive of established privilege
and limiting debate and discussion accordingly’ (10).
When it comes to Tamil Dailies & Weeklies, Thinakkural (20
years) is owned by Thinakkural Daily publishers , Veerakesari (29 years)
by the Express Group, and Sudaroli (15 years), and Udayan (24) by
Udayan Publishers. All the chief editors are Tamils. It is natural that they
all expressed a positive representation of the Indian intervention in 1987.But
later when the IPKF turned against the militants and Tamils, they began to
criticize the Indian approach not the intervention, for, the Tamil press has
always been positive about an Indian intervention because of the support and
sympathy from Tamil Nadu. They welcomed
the International intervention in 2002 as well. Being the media of minority
representation, they were always positive about any international intervention.
The second filter highlights the influence of advertising values on the
news production process, for, Chomsky says that ‘like other businesses, [the
media] sell a product to buyers. Their market is advertisers, and the
"product" is audiences’ (7). To remain financially viable, most media
must sell markets (readers) to buyers (advertisers). This dependency can directly
influence media performance. Chomsky in Manufacturing
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (8) remarks that media content naturalizes, reflecting ‘the
perspectives and interests of the sellers, the buyers, and the product’ (see
also Herman, in The Myth of the Liberal Media: An Edward Herman Reader). The ANCL publications being government newspapers still are said
to be the most widely read newspapers, due its advertisements and notices
covering the educational, employment and government departmental information.
Thus, the political ideologies of the party in power in matters of conflict and
intervention were the ideologies of the media institution’s propaganda. It
reached the international, Sinhala and Tamil readership largely because it ran
the English papers, Sunday Observer and the Daily News
(92 years), the Sinhala newspaper, Dinamina (97 years) and the
Tamil newspaper, Thinakaran (73 years) as well. Unfortunately the private media could
not compete with the State media in advertising business. However, the ideologically based propaganda
was the prime attraction which made the newspapers sell substantially.
The Sri Lankan media is generally against the internationalization
of the conflict and international intervention. They project an aggressor versus victim frame in the International
Community-Sri Lanka relations. The media appreciates it when the international
community acts against the militants and Tamil Diaspora internationally and
criticizes when the international community intervenes in the ethnic conflict
resolution and insists on refraining from the military approach. Chomsky in Media Control says: ‘the
point of public relations slogans like "Support our troops" is that
they don't mean anything... that's the whole point of good propaganda. You want
to create a slogan that nobody's going to be against, and everybody's going to
be for. Nobody knows what it means, because it doesn't mean anything. Its
crucial value is that it diverts your attention from a question that does mean
something: Do you support our policy? That's the one you're not allowed to talk
about (26).
They accuse the international community on their ‘double standards’
in global war on terror versus Sri Lankan war on
the Tamil militants and in approaching domestic versus
international terrorism. It goes
well with Chomsky’s statement in Necessary Illusions with regard to the US: ‘the United States has no principled opposition
to democratic forms, as long as the climate for business operations is
preserved’ (111). The Sri Lankan media takes advantage of the US double standards in
international relations and interventions to criticize the conflict situation.
The media suppresses the human rights violations of the government and its
armed forces and foreground ‘crushing terrorism’. This approach tallies with
Chomsky’s attribution of the USA:
‘if the enemies of democracy are not "Communists," then they are
"terrorists"; still better, "Communist terrorists," or
terrorists supported by International Communism. The rise and decline of
international terrorism in the 1980s provides much insight into "the
utility of interpretations." (113). Thus in Sri Lanka the media supports governments
and the international community resolve the conflicts militarily or with the
minimum devolution which does not affect the majoritarian nationalist interests.
They oppose when the fighting minorities win their political rights or maximum
devolution.
The media appreciates when the international community acts against
the militants and Tamil nationalists nationally and assists the State militarily
and economically; they criticize when the international community advocates a
political solution fair to the Tamils by refraining from the military approach
and when the international community treats both the government and militants as
equals. Chomsky in Media Control relates this situation to his idea that
‘hypocrites are those who apply to others the standards that they refuse to
accept for themselves (77). The media appreciate it when the International Non-governmental
Organizations (INGOs) assist the South in economic development and humanitarian
services but the media criticize when the INGOs assist the northeast
rehabilitation programs as the fund was going into the hands of the militants
and when the international community criticized the armed forces and the
government. This goes well with Chomsky’s statement in Necessary
Illusions that a solicitous concern for democracy
and human rights may go hand in hand with tolerance for large-scale slaughter,
or direct participation in it (108).
In
accordance with the same principles, it is natural that vast outrage should be
evoked by the terror of the Pol Pot regime, while reporters in Phnom Penh in
1973, when the U.S. bombing of populated areas of rural Cambodia had reached
its peak, should ignore the testimony of the hundreds of thousands of refugees
before their eyes. Such selective perception guarantees that little is known
about the scale and character of these U.S. atrocities, though enough is known to
indicate that they may have been comparable to those attributable to the Khmer
Rouge at the time when the chorus of indignation swept the West in 1977, and
that they contributed significantly to the rise, and probably the brutality, of
the Khmer Rouge (108).
The third filter notes that dominant elites routinely facilitate the
news-gathering process: providing press releases, advance copies of speeches,
periodicals, photo opportunities and ready-for-news analysis (Herman and
Chomsky 19). Thus, government and corporate sources are attractive to the media
for purely economic reasons. Such sources are favoured and are routinely
endorsed and legitimized by the media because they are recognizable and are viewed
as prima facie credible. Information provided to the media by corporate and
state sources does not require fact checking or costly background research and
is typically portrayed as accurate. A similar situation has been prevalent in Sri Lanka
on conflict intervention and governance issues. However, they are attractive not
for purely economic reasons but for political as well as ideological ones.
The Sri Lankan media have historically been
divided along ethnic lines, a trend which dates back to colonial times. According
to International Centre for Ethnic Studies in The Reconciliation survey Report, in 1860s, a number of reactionary Sinhala
publications such as Lanka Lokaya,
Lakmini Pahana and
Sandaresa were
started, taking a distinctly Sinhala-Buddhist stance. This religious and cultural focus could also be
seen in the Tamil media of the time. In the 1950s, the media played a
significant role in bringing the “Sinhala only” policy. The media have always
projected a discourse of resistance to conflict resolution and intervention. The
Sinhala elites occupy prominent positions in the public and private sectors.
They recognize the ordinary Sinhala mass only for commenting on the negative
consequences of terrorism and war, not the causes of the conflict or solutions.
Importantly, the editors incorporate preferred meanings into news
discourse, originated from official sources identified as ‘experts’. Thus, news
discourse ‘may be skewed in the direction desired by the elites, the government
and “the market”’ (the Sinhala mass) (Herman and Chomsky 23). Concurrently, the
‘preferred’ meanings structured into news discourse are typically ‘those that
are functional for elites’.
Flak, the fourth filter, means that dominant social institutions
(most notably the state) possess the power and requisite organizational
resources to pressure media to play a propagandist role in society. Herman and
Chomsky explain that: Flak refers to negative responses to a media statement or
program. . . . It may be organized centrally or locally, or it may consist of
the entirely independent actions of individuals (26). In sum, the authors
maintain that there are powerful interests that routinely encourage right-wing
bias in media. (27–8). The monopoly of the media by
successive governments affected the reporting of the conflict. However, there
is no state control over the privately owned newspapers, except under emergency
or Prevention of Terrorism Act censorship when they are in force.
The policies, activities and achievements of governments get
publicity only through the Press. It can help influence people with diversified,
even opposing ideologies. Religion, language, and culture play an important role
in the actions and policies of the government and also the other Political
parties. Inevitably, newspapers get linked to political parties, ethnic
communities and regions. This is evident in Sri Lanka as well. History has
shown Presidents and Prime Ministers attempting to control the press. Mrs.
Sirimavo Bandaranaike, took over the Lake House (The Daily News & The Sunday
Observer). Almost at the same time the Sun Group of newspapers was sealed,
while the Times Group was manoeuvred into bankruptcy. Late Mr. J.R. Jayawardena
brought the notorious Parliamentary Privileges Act, which placed the media
directly under the control of Parliament. Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa did not
depend on subtle tactics.
President Chandrikka Bandaranaike
Kumaratunge's (CBK) latest move followed the tradition controlling independent
dissemination of news in the media. In setting up the Policy Research and
Information Unit (PRIU), the government was in effect restricting access to information
about the government as well as the forces. She, in addition to her various
responsibilities as Minister of Finance, Minister of Defence and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, is also the Chief Editor of the Government
Media. Since governments know the power of the media, as an ideological
apparatus, they prefer to use it for achieving their ends.
The fifth filter is ‘anti-communism’ as a national religion and
control mechanism. The tail end of 2003 saw the re-emergence
of a strong Buddhist nationalist agenda within the mainstream politics. This
was reflected in the Sinhala language media. It was particularly evident in the
attention given to the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a party that fielded
Buddhist monks in the general election campaign in April 2004 for the first
time in Sri Lanka’s
history. According to Centre for Policy Alternatives, in Monitoring of Media Coverage, the Media
Monitor points out: “Sri Lankan newspapers of the three language media cater to
sets of individuals who inhabit different worlds and espouse different
worldviews. Though the island is small, yet the gulf that separates these
language groups appears to be ever-widening, particularly between the Tamil
readership and the rest” (5). This is similar to what Chomsky
in Media Control says about the US media making propaganda for the US
international intervention: ‘it is ... necessary to whip up the population in
support of foreign adventures. Usually the population is pacifist, just like
they were during the First World War. The public sees no reason to get involved
in foreign adventures, killing, and torture. So you have to whip them up. And
to whip them up you have to frighten them’ (30).
According
to the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), the Sri Lankan media of all three
languages were monitored by the CPA Media Unit from March to August 2004. A study
of the Oslo Declaration jointly
made by the government and the militants demonstrates the
politico-ideological divide between the communities. On 05 December 2002, the government
and the militants agreed to explore a political solution within the framework
of a federal political system during the third round of talks. Most of the
Sinhala private newspapers were not positive in their response whereas all the
Tamil newspapers were positive. The government run newspapers like the Ceylon Daily News and the Sunday
Observer and the pro-UNP government newspaper the Sunday Leader were positive. But the rest of the private run
newspapers by the Sinhalese like The Island and The Sunday Times
were not.
The filters continuously interact with one another and operate on an
individual and institutional basis (Herman and Chomsky, 2; Rai, 40). They say
that the filter constraints excise the news that powerful interests deem not
fit to print.
The papers generally comment on the manner of “the root causes”, “the
legitimate grievances and injustices of the Tamils”, “the perceptions of the
Sinhala community”, and “the importance of the southern consensus” from their
ideological affiliations. They balance the Sinhala ‘isms’ with the Tamil
‘isms’. The media lay stress on the former but silenced the latter,
highlighting the moral frame: the affected versus the aggressor. Both the Leader
and News use the discourse themes such as “preserving democracy”, “pluralism”,
“tolerance in finding the solution”’, “inclusion of opposition opinion”, “agreement
as the outcome of the negotiation”, and “negotiations and compromises to construct
the impartial nature of the media in their comment on the national as well as
international political universals”.
The Island recollects the resistance
to federal system from 1958 and “the rejection of federalism”. But no such
federal proposal was given to the Tamils. It was only a media-invented event.
Both the Island and News always remind readers of “the JVP (Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna) and JHU opposition” to the peace talk “the hurdles and
obstacles”. The Island criticizes the militants’
violations of the 13th Amendment (the Provincial Council System), Sinhalese resistance
to the 13th amendment. All the four newspapers comment in their respective ways
on the “contradictory” nature of the policies of the two major parties on the issue,
of their party rivalry in general and of their leaders’ power struggle and consensus and cohabitation. They “insist” on a bipartisan approach
“reaching southern consensus” while the media could not reach a consensus on “a
fair solution”. It thus foregrounds that it was only the Sinhala politicians,
not the whole community or the pan-Sinhala Buddhist nationalists who are
responsible for the on-going conflict.
8.
Conclusion
The Sinhala Press played a major role in sharpening the ethnic
conflict as it showed narrow nationalistic assumptions. The first filter of concentrated
ownership played a strong role in determining or deterring the international
intervention and conflict resolution. The second filter of advertising as the primary
income source of the mass media played a minimum role because the significance
of the issue goes beyond mere profitability. It is deeply ideological and
attitudinal; the third filter of the reliance of the media on information
provided by government, business, and ‘experts’ is applicable but it is the
choice of the media and it is intentional, not unintentional as Herman and
Chomsky point out on the third filter; for the model says that the media can
follow the positions of the state, institutions and elites unconsciously as
they have been mechanized by these filters for a long time. The fourth filter
of ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the media is considerably true especially
in matters of commenting on the Sri Lankan Forces’ war against the militants
and Tamil nationalists and the victimization of the Tamils by the Sri Lankan
military operations; however, reporting on the conflict resolution and
intervention, the media consciously distort the facts. The fifth filter of
‘anti-communism’ as a national religion and control mechanism is very pervasive
and persistent here in the form of ‘anti-terrorism’ and ‘anti-federalism’. Finally
Chomsky in Media Control says:
Pick the topic you like: the Middle East, international terrorism,
Central America, whatever it is—the picture of the world that's presented to
the public has only the remotest relation to reality. The truth of the matter
is buried under edifice after edifice of lies upon lies. It's all been a
marvellous success from the point of view in deterring the threat of democracy,
achieved under conditions of freedom, which is extremely interesting. It's not
like a totalitarian state, where it's done by force. These achievements are
under conditions of freedom (37).
There
has been always subtle forms of construction for a solution within the unitary
constitution of Sri Lanka
due to their ethno-centrist and cultural nationalist’ positions. All the
newspapers foreground the elimination of terrorism and give priority to it. The
self-serving partisan nature of the editorials is clearly ideological, and
articulated along the fundamental ideological divide between the Sinhalese and
the Tamils at the community level. All levels and dimensions of the discursive
structures of the article express, with some variations, this basic fundamental
ethnic divide.
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